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Abstract 
The global financial crisis has shown that financial market regulation focused on the li-
quidity and solvency position of individual financial intermediaries does not suffice to 
mitigate the overall risks to financial stability. Furthermore, the real economic costs of 
financial instability are considerably higher than expected. A core element of the interna-
tional policy response to the crisis has been to strengthen the macroprudential orientation 
of financial market regulation. Macroprudential policy and regulation stand for enhanced 
regulatory focus on systemic risks in the financial system and their repercussions for the 
macroeconomy. Thus far, the debate on macroprudential regulation has mainly focused on 
the needs of developed economies and examined regulatory proposals against the back-
ground of advanced economies. However, empirical evidence shows that developing and 
emerging economies have suffered stronger and more costly economic cycles and disrup-
tive financial crises than advanced economies – with less effective fiscal and monetary 
policy tools to mitigate and resolve them. In preparation for future shocks, policy makers 
in developing countries must urgently develop macroprudential policy frameworks to fos-
ter financial and macroeconomic stability. This paper presents the most important aspects 
of macroprudential policy making for developing and emerging economies. It explains the 
concepts of macroprudential regulation and introduces how macroprudential policy is cur-
rently being implemented. It then identifies the major sources of systemic risk and dis-
cusses the specific challenges to developing macroprudential policy frameworks for de-
veloping and emerging economies, and offers recommendations with regard to macropru-
dential policy choices for developing and emerging economies. 
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1 Motivation and introduction 
The global financial crisis taught policy makers and academic researchers two things 
about financial market regulation. First, financial market regulation that focuses on the 
liquidity and solvency position of individual financial intermediaries does not suffice to 
curb the overall risks to financial stability. Second, the economic costs of financial insta-
bility are much higher than expected. In this crisis, advanced economies have suffered the 
largest output losses because the depth and complexity of their financial markets make any 
financial crisis highly disruptive. Not only have the direct costs of bank bailouts and li-
quidity provision for the financial sector burdened fiscal balances, but indirect costs such 
as fiscal stimulus packages and large output losses have also increased public debt and led 
to solvency crises in several euro-zone countries. 
A debate is raging about how to prevent, or at least mitigate, financial crises that have se-
rious consequences for the real sector. More attention is being paid to the notion of regu-
lating the whole financial system and its link to the macroeconomy, and renewing interest 
in macroprudential policy and regulation.1 Academics and national and international poli-
cy makers are heatedly discussing how to design financial market regulation in order to 
foster macroeconomic stability. The macroprudential orientation of current policy ar-
rangements also received strong political backing from the Group of 20 (G20) Leaders, 
who prioritized further work on macroprudential frameworks at the Seoul Summit in No-
vember 2010 (FSB / IMF / BIS 2011a). 
The experience of the advanced economies, the effects of the global financial crisis on 
their own economies, and the widespread discussion about macroprudential policy has 
reintroduced the topic of financial crises and financial market regulation to policy mak-
ers in emerging and developing countries. It is common knowledge that financial and 
macroeconomic stability are prerequisites for attracting long-term investment and ensu-
ing sustainable economic development and growth in developing countries. However, 
empirical evidence shows that developing and emerging economies have experienced 
stronger and more costly economic cycles and disruptive financial crises than advanced 
economies. Claessens / Kose / Terrones (2011), who study the interaction of business and 
financial cycles, discover that business cycles often coincide with cycles in credit and 
housing prices. In emerging economies, business cycles tend to be significantly more pro-
nounced than in advanced economies; as a consequence, their recessions cost three times 
more. Recessions that include financial disruptions tend to be longer and deeper than other 
recessions. 
Many developing and emerging countries have less effective economic policy tools to 
mitigate and resolve macroeconomic and financial crises. Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
document how, in comparison with advanced economies, emerging and developing econ-
omies make much larger fiscal outlays when they intervene in their financial sectors and 
rely less on monetary and fiscal policies to resolve banking crises. Perhaps this is because 
in comparison with advanced economies, developing and emerging economies have worse 
financing options for counter-cyclical fiscal policy and generally less leeway for monetary 
                                                            
1 According to Clement (2010), since the term was coined in the late 1970s, it has denoted concerns 
about financial stability and the macroeconomy; over time, however, the focus of concerns has 
changed. 
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policy. Therefore, in preparation for future shocks, policy makers in developing countries 
should urgently develop macroprudential policy frameworks that foster financial and mac-
roeconomic stability. 
Furthermore, the financial sectors in emerging economies exhibit strong growth records 
both in scale and scope. But financial market regulation that is appropriate for the current 
state of development may prove insufficient for more complex financial market structures, 
leading to more increased systemic risks, like those found in advanced economies. The big 
challenge is how to allow continued financial development in the context of a solid finan-
cial system. However, since post-crisis reforms aim to ensure more stable and resilient 
financial systems, there might be trade-offs in terms of growth. Therefore, policy makers 
must assess the impact of macroprudential financial market regulation on the crucial driv-
ers of economic growth and shape the macroprudential policy framework to address ap-
propriately developing countries’ needs and specific circumstances. 
Because discussions of macroprudential regulation have so far focused mainly on the 
needs of developed economies, and the resulting regulatory proposals have primarily been 
examined against the background and needs of advanced economies, this paper aims to not 
only give a concise overview of the aims and scope of macroprudential financial market 
regulation and how it relates to other economic policies, potential indicators, available in-
struments, and institutional set-up, but also to evaluate its relevance and implications for 
emerging and developing economies. Finally, the paper strives to establish recommenda-
tions about macroprudential policy choices for developing and emerging economies. 
Section 2 clarifies the aims and scope of macroprudential regulation and how it relates to 
microprudential regulation and other economic policies. Section 3 gives an overview of 
macroprudential indicators and instruments, explains how a macroprudential policy 
framework could be set up, and adds to the discussion about the need for international 
coordination and cooperation with regard to macroprudential regulation. Section 4 takes 
the perspective of emerging and developing economies, analyses the specific circumstanc-
es of macroprudential regulation and offers recommendations regarding their macropru-
dential policy options. It starts by ascertaining the financial markets and institutions that 
are sources of systemic risks and then examines specific challenges with regard to imple-
menting macroprudential policies in emerging and developing economies. Section 5 con-
cludes and offers suggestions about how development cooperation can support developing 
countries’ participation in the changing global financial landscape. 
2 Objectives of macroprudential financial market regulation  
2.1 Aims and scope 
The global financial crisis stimulated debate among government officials, policy makers at 
international institutions, and academics about how to design financial market regulation 
to foster macroeconomic stability. 
Because the financial and the real sector are closely linked, it is assumed that as long as an 
economy enjoys financial stability, the macroeconomy will be unaffected, allowing for the 
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pursuit of long-term goals such as growth and equity. Macroprudential financial market 
regulation thus strives to ensure financial stability. 
According to Bank of England (2009), financial stability is reached when financial mar-
kets enable the stable provision of financial intermediation services to the economy: pay-
ment services, credit intermediation and insurance against risk. This view advocates 
macroprudential policy that takes account of the entire financial system including interac-
tions between the financial and real sector, regardless of the type of institution that pro-
vides the financial intermediation services to the economy. The basic processes of finan-
cial intermediation, including maturity transformation, leveraged finance, and risk trans-
fer, are offered by a variety of enterprises. Macroprudential policy should cover the formal 
banking sector as well as the ‘shadow banking’ sector, i.e. hedge funds, money market 
funds, broker-dealer firms, structured investment vehicles, and insurance companies (Han-
son / Kashyap / Stein 2011). 
Financial stability is usually threatened by systemic risk in the financial sector. Systemic 
risk or system-wide financial risk is defined as a risk of disruptions to financial services 
caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system that negatively impact the 
real economy.2 Systemic risk can either be triggered by an exogenous shock or an endoge-
nous shock from the financial system.3 The global financial crisis has demonstrated that 
regulation focused solely on individual institutions does not adequately deal with system-
wide financial risks, which are a major source of financial instability. Macroprudential 
policy has emerged to concentrate on systemic risks: it aims to make the financial system 
more resilient to external and internal shocks. 
Systemic risk has two important dimensions to be addressed by macroprudential policy:  
1. the time dimension and 
2. the cross-sectional dimension.4  
Systemic risks develop over time as a result of a cumulative, amplifying mechanism that 
operates within and between the financial system and the real economy. Economic agents 
exhibit pro-cyclical behaviour by increasing exposure during the boom of an economic 
cycle and becoming highly risk-averse during a bust-phase. This tendency creates exces-
sive leverage in financial firms, corporations and households, which can lead to credit and 
liquidity cycles as well as excessive maturity mismatches. Procyclicality makes the finan-
cial and real sector more vulnerable to endogenous and exogenous shocks and more prone 
to financial distress.  
The cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk describes the distribution of risk in the 
financial system at any point in time. This type of systemic risk originates at the level of 
individual institutions because of their size, interconnectedness, complexity and substitut-
ability of their activities. Contagion can then result from intra-firm exposures and vulnera-
bility to common shocks, triggering spillovers between institutions. Then a solvency or 
liquidity event in any one firm can be followed by cascading effects because of the linkag-
                                                            
2 This definition is used by FSB / IMF / BIS (2011a) and (2011b) in their report to the G20. 
3 See ECB (2009) and Galati and Moessner (2011) for a thorough discussion of the literature. 
4 See the extensive coverage in Bank of England (2009) and IMF (2011b). 
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es between firms and can induce system-wide liquidity squeezes, bank runs as well as fire 
sales. The bankruptcy of one financial institution thus imposes unacceptable costs on the 
rest of the economy, often triggering bank rescues that can create a vicious circle between 
the financial and fiscal systems. 
2.2 Sources of systemic risk: theoretical underpinnings 
Understanding the sources of systemic risk should help determine the types of risk that 
macroprudential policy should focus on. In itself, risk is necessary and does not harm the 
economy; however, distortions can cause risk levels that are not socially optimal. Market 
failures typically come from three underlying sources: incentives, information or coordi-
nation.5 Figure 1 provides numerous examples of roles played by these types of market 
failure in the current and past crises. 
Incentive problems can arise as unintended consequences of public policy, such as when 
insurance distorts risk-taking incentives. Insuring downside risk encourages an agent to 
engage in behaviour that is riskier than not having any insurance. Explicit or implicit 
guarantees of public sector support for state-regulated financial institutions can influence 
financial institutions’ behaviour the way insurance does. Expectations of a public safety 
net can contribute to the practice of under-pricing risk among financial institutions, in par-
ticular by those that view themselves as too big or too important to fail. Incentive prob-
lems can also result from institutional reasons, such as limited liability. Financial contracts 
typically limit the downside risk borne by shareholders and managers due to limited liabil-
ity. This asymmetry in pay-offs generates an incentive for both parties to take large risks 
in order to increase expected returns. Banks’ pre-crisis business strategies, including high-
er leverage and larger trading books, reinforced the asymmetry of pay-offs and the incen-
tives for risk-taking. 
Information frictions cause markets to fail when buyers doubt the quality of assets. The 
2007 freeze of the interbank and asset-backed commercial paper markets is a good exam-
ple: investors bid down prices because they had imperfect information about the quality of 
underlying assets, while sellers of good assets were unwilling to sell at prevailing market 
prices. Information deficits can lead to network externalities because agents do not have 
the information needed to determine the risks to which they are exposed. Then the conta-
gious consequences of one firm failing may be opaque to others in the financial network. 
A large body of evidence indicates that people may not process information in a fully ra-
tional way. Risk illusion, or disaster myopia, can occur when, after a period of relative 
stability, financial investors collectively underestimate the probability of adverse scenari-
os. Risk misperception is widely viewed as the reason for the historically low compensa-
tion that investors demanded for holding risky assets in the run-up to the crisis. 
Coordination problems can hinder individuals acting in an optimal way. Although collec-
tive action may be in the interest of each group member, in the absence of a means of co-
ordination, such equilibrium may be unachievable. Coordination problems can generate 
                                                            
5  The following section builds on Bank of England (2009). ECB (2009) states more generally that a 
variety of market imperfections (e.g. asymmetric information, externalities, incomplete markets) are 
behind the formation of systemic risk. 
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financial instabilities such as booms, bank runs, asset fire sales, credit crunches, and li-
quidity problems. For example, solvency concerns can cause banks to seek to shrink their 
balance sheets by constraining new lending or by selling assets. While individually ration-
al, collectively this behaviour risks generating worse outcomes for everyone because re-
stricting new lending generates a credit crunch for the real economy and a fire sale of as-
sets reduces market liquidity and drives down asset prices. These outcomes can even ag-
gravate the banking sector’s solvency problems. 
The frictions described here multiply within the financial system, affecting the real econ-
omy through two basic channels: leverage and maturity transformation. Leverage defines 
the degree to which assets are funded by debt, while maturity transformation determines 
the degree to which shorter-term liabilities are used to finance longer-term assets. Both 
leverage and maturity transformations are socially useful. Debt allows households to sus-
tain consumption despite possible income disruptions, while maturity transformation per-
mits smooth consumption over time for depositors and enable societies to fund long-term 
investments. Market failures such as incentive, information, and coordination problems 
can lead to excessive leverage and maturity mismatch. Furthermore, a high degree of in-
terconnectedness of wholesale financial activities can spur contagion.6 Excessive leverage 
and maturity mismatches make the financial sector and the real economy more fragile in 
the face of adverse shocks because they act as amplifying mechanisms, magnifying the 
impact of liquidity and solvency shocks so that system-wide risk can develop. 
2.3 Macroprudential vs. microprudential regulation and supervision 
The difference between the macro- and microprudential focus of financial market regula-
tion is best illustrated by the banking sector. Banks are traditionally financed through gov-
ernment-insured deposits. Deposit insurance helps prevent bank runs but also changes the 
incentives for bank managers to be willing to take excessive risks because they know that 
taxpayers will cover any losses. Microprudential regulation of bank capital forces banks to 
internalize these costs and protects the deposit insurance fund by lowering the probability 
of a bank default to an acceptable level (Hanson / Kashyap / Stein 2011). Microprudential 
policy aims at idiosyncratic risk and depositor protection, thereby ensuring the safety of 
individual financial institutions. 
Since the financial system is made up of individual institutions, the goals of microprudential 
supervision and macroprudential policy often coincide.7 But the most recent financial crisis 
has shown that solving the incentive problem at each individual institution does not ensure 
the stability of the entire financial system. Interconnectedness and the collective behaviour 
of banks, other financial institutions and agents may generate externalities8 that can lead to 
                                                            
6  See also ECB (2009) for a discussion of important features of the financial system that lead to a greater 
fragility in comparison with other economic sectors. 
7 See Group of 30 (2010) and compare with CGFS (2010). 
8 See also De Nicolò / Favara / Ratnovski (2012) for a discussion of three sources of market failure that 
require macroprudential intervention: externalities related to strategic complementarities, externalities 
related to fire sales, and externalities related to interconnectedness. 
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Figure 1: The role of market failures in financial crises, past and present 
 Financial markets Institutions 
Incentive  
problems 
  
Moral hazard and 
‘too big to fail’ 
• ‘The Greenspan Put’ – some argue that 
soaring equity prices earlier this decade  
reflected investors’ beliefs that the Federal  
Reserve would act to prevent the market 
from failing, but not to stop it rising 
(2000s). 
• Support for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear 
Stearns and AIG (2008). 
• October 2008 recapitalisation plan and 
March 2009 Asset Protection Scheme  
offered to large UK Banks. 
• Continental Illinois (1984), US Savings and 
Loan crisis (1980s/90s). 
Incomplete  
contracts  
 • Compensation structures that gave  
incentives to pursue unduly risky practices. 
Information 
frictions 
  
Network  
externalities 
• Credit default swap market at time of 
Lehman Brothers and AIG stress 
(September/October 2008) – contagious 
consequences of default were unclear to 
others in the financial network. 
 
Risk illusion • The ‘search for yield’ – buoyed by illusory 
reductions in macroeconomic uncertainty, 
investors tried to maintain high returns in a 
low interest rate environment by purchasing 
ever-riskier products (2003-07). 
• Widespread use of value at risk (VaR) models 
for risk management purposes, which were 
estimated over episodes of relative calm in  
financial markets, and so could not capture 
the possibility of extreme market volatility 
(1997 onwards). 
• Investors in Bernard L Madoff’s funds extrapo-
lated apparent trends in profits (2008). 
Adverse selection • The freeze of the interbank and asset-backed 
commercial paper markets (August 2007) – 
investors bid down prices as they had imper-
fect information on the quality of underlying 
assets, and sellers of ‘good’ assets were un-
willing to sell at prevailing market prices. 
 
Information 
cascades 
• Contagious currency devaluations during 
the Asian financial crisis (1997) 
• Short-selling of the shares of some UK 
banks (2008). 
Co-ordination  
problems 
  
Peer  
benchmarking 
• Condition of financial system in mid-2007, 
as described by Chuck Prince’s infamous 
quote. 
• Peer group comparison among investment 
managers. 
 
Fire-sale  
externalities 
 • Series of bank mergers and rescues that 
followed failure of Lehman Brothers to  
prevent contagious fire sales, e.g. Bradford 
and Bingley and HBOS (2008). 
• Following the 2001 ‘dotcom’ equity  
correction, losses faced by UK life insurers 
could have led to a potential ‘asset price 
loss-spiral’ through equity sales – FSA  
intervened by relaxing solvency rules. 
Credit crunch  
externalities 
• Bank lending to households and corporate 
tightened significantly in 2008/09. 
 
Runs on retail  
or wholesale  
deposits 
• Runs on money market funds (2008), 
prompting the introduction of the Federal 
Reserve’s Money Market Fund facility 
• Runs on Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
(2008) 
• Run on Northern Rock (2007), leading to 
the introduction of increased deposit insur-
ance limit in the United Kingdom (2008). 
Source:  Adopted from Bank of England (2009) 
Macroprudential financial market regulation 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 7 
 
systemic risk with adverse effects on the real economy. Another problem of ‘traditional’ 
prudential policy is that actions that are appropriate for individual firms may collectively 
cause or aggravate system-wide problems9 that can be even more critical during crises. 
For example, a microprudentially-oriented regulator who pushes a troubled bank to restore 
its capital ratio usually does not care whether banks adjust by raising new capital or by 
shrinking assets. But when a large proportion of the financial system is in difficulty, at-
tempts by many institutions to simultaneously shrink their assets are likely to damage the 
macroeconomy (Hanson / Kashyap / Stein 2011). Banks either decide to cut lending 
across the board, which can result in a credit crunch, or they try to sell financial assets 
simultaneously which can lead to price declines that damage the balance sheets of other 
institutions, as well as funding problems, fire sales, and cause the system’s liquidity to 
evaporate. When multiple financial institutions that have been hit by a common shock 
simultaneously shrink their balance sheets, they can destabilize the broader financial sys-
tem and generate large social costs (Hanson / Kashyap / Stein 2011). Macroprudential 
financial market regulation strives to limit these social costs. So, a macroprudential ap-
proach to financial market regulation acknowledges the importance of general equilibrium 
effects, seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole, and recognises the systemic 
importance of individual institutions. Macroprudential policy, which is understood as an 
ongoing task that is prospective and preventive, is distinct from other financial market 
regulation such as crisis management or resolution policy.10 
2.4 Relation to other economic policies 
Both monetary and fiscal policies have an impact on systemic risk and therefore affect 
macroprudential policy making. The relationship of macroprudential policy to these two 
macroeconomic policies is characterised by strong feedback effects and complementarity. 
While fiscal policy and public debt levels can create vulnerability for the financial sector11 
macroprudential regulation or rather the absence of effective macroprudential policy can 
seriously strain public budgets. This becomes clear whenever bank rescues or crisis man-
agement instruments need to be financed. Recent examples include Ireland and Iceland, 
where Laeven and Valencia (2012) estimate that fiscal outlays for crisis management 
amounted to 40.7% and 44.2% of GDP, respectively. 
Feedback effects between monetary and macroprudential policies are greater and more 
complex, particularly in three areas: risk-taking, asset price and credit booms, and trans-
mission channels. 
Representing one strand of literature, Borio and Zhu (2008) argue that the stance of mone-
tary policy12 affects risk perceptions and risk tolerance, thereby influencing risk-taking 
incentives and systemic risk. However, monetary stability reduces the financial system’s 
vulnerability to pro-cyclical tendencies, since risk-taking varies with the economic cycle 
and stable medium-term policy rates reduce up- and downswings. 
                                                            
9 See also IMF (2011b). 
10 See also CGFS (2010). 
11 This effect can be studied by examining the eurozone’s banking sector. 
12 In the current crisis, this means very low policy rates over a long period. 
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In asset price and credit booms, monetary policy could more actively support macropru-
dential policy by restraining rapid growth in bank balance sheets during the upswings. 
Borio and White (2004) and Borio and Drehmann (2009a) argue that monetary policy 
should lean against the build-up of financial imbalances and the cycle of financial stabil-
ity. But this can have several drawbacks. 
First, monetary policy guides the aggregate price of goods and services in the economy by 
balancing the nominal demand and supply capacity of the economy. Monetary policy 
makers’ focus on inflation can put them in a poor position to moderate movements in fi-
nancial asset prices or emerging financial imbalances. To slow spending in the economy, a 
central bank would have to set interest rates above the level required to meet its inflation 
target – which could generate lower output and cause higher-than-expected unemploy-
ment. Second, monetary policy makers risk missing their inflation target and losing credi-
bility (Group of 30 2010). Third, the main instrument of monetary policy, a short-term and 
risk-free interest rate, is not always very useful in impacting on financial prices and quan-
tities due to uncertainty about its effect when risk premiums are rapidly adjusting, both up 
and down (Bank of England 2009). 
However, macroprudential policy interventions have macroeconomic effects. For exam-
ple, raising capital requirements in a credit boom could dampen aggregate demand and 
influence the monetary and fiscal policy environments. 
With regard to monetary policy transmission, macroprudential policy measures strengthen 
the resilience of the financial system and can therefore reinforce monetary policy by 
shielding the economy from sharp financial disruptions. Macroprudential settings influ-
ence credit supply conditions, an important channel of monetary policy transmission. 
Monetary policy can have a greater effect on conditions once macroprudential policy has 
reduced the impact of financial frictions on credit supply.13 
Successful monetary and macroprudential policies tend to reinforce each other. However, 
macroprudential policy cannot substitute for sound macroeconomic policies. Monetary 
and fiscal policies must continue to focus on correcting macroeconomic imbalances while 
macroprudential policy concentrates on containing systemic risk (FSB / IMF / BIS 2011b). 
3 Implementation issues 
3.1 Measurement of systemic risk and choice of indicators 
Ideally, measuring systemic risk should provide information about its build-up in both 
time and cross-sectional dimensions, be accurate, have the least possible time lag, and be 
able to forecast financial instability and its consequences for the real sector (IMF 
2011b). However, even FSB / IMF / BIS (2011b) acknowledges that “the difficulty of 
this task should not be underestimated and this remains very much work in progress”. 
Measurements of the time dimension are needed in order to reveal the gradual build-up of 
imbalances and the likelihood and potential impact of shocks. Measurements must be found 
                                                            
13 See also CGFS (2010). 
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for the cross-sectional dimension to indicate not only the concentration of risk within the 
system but also the degree of interconnectedness, and the probability of contagion. Indica-
tors of the systemic importance of individual institutions14 must also be identified. 
Moreover, the measurement of systemic risk should be able to reliably distinguish between 
‘normal’ fluctuations and trends, and profound imbalances or excesses. The latter call for 
macroprudential treatment that should not attempt to correct fundamentals-driven cyclical 
fluctuations and longer-term trends (CGFS 2010). Borio and Drehmann (2009b) emphasise 
another role of systemic risk measurement, arguing that it decisively influences the macro-
prudential framework because ex-ante measurement supports the strategy’s real time im-
plementation while ex-post measurement helps to ensure regulatory authorities’ accountabil-
ity. 
The literature discusses several methodological approaches to measurement (Galati and 
Moessner 2011; Borio / Drehmann 2009b; IMF / FSB / BIS 2011b). First, there are 
measures dealing with the time dimension: aggregate indicators usually based on balance 
sheets or indicators of market conditions, early warning indicators (EWI), quantitative anal-
ysis based on vector autoregressions (VAR), and macro stress tests. 
Aggregate indicators such as leverage, maturity, and currency mismatches15 are usually de-
ducted from aggregate balance sheets. Regulatory authorities used these before the crisis. 
Shin (2011) argues that aggregate systemic risk measurements derived from the liability side 
of balance sheets are particularly useful. In normal times, financial intermediaries mainly 
finance their assets with core funding in the form of retail deposits from households. How-
ever, in periods of excessive credit growth, financial institutions revert to non-core liabilities 
like securitised notes, financial commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and foreign ex-
change borrowing. Shin therefore proposes using the ratio of core-to-non-core liabilities as 
an indicator of aggregate systemic risk because it correctly reflects the financial cycle. 
Rodriguez-Moreno and Pena (2011) test different systemic risk indicators for the United 
States and European banking systems, concluding that investors and regulators should rely 
on simple, robust indicators based on credit derivatives and market interest rate data. They 
warn that although indicators based on the liquid market prices of credit-sensitive instru-
ments seem useful, it is not wise to make inferences based on the prices of financial prod-
ucts traded in thin markets. 
However, aggregate indicators deducted from balance sheets are backward-looking, or at 
best contemporaneous and severely limit a macroprudential policy maker’s ability to react to 
systemic risks in a timely fashion. 
Leading and early warning indicators that can help avoid this problem are combined in early 
warning models. Drehmann et al. (2010) discover that the deviation of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio from its trend serves as a quite reliable leading indicator of financial distress. Borio and 
Drehmann (2009a) extend earlier findings about how unusually strong increases in credit, 
equity and property prices indicate financial imbalances using the framework of a simple 
                                                            
14 See BCBS (2011) for details. Systemically important banks are characterised by their size, intercon-
nectedness, complexity, and lack of substitutability or global scope. 
15 More indicators are found in the IMF set of ‘financial soundness indicators’. 
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EWI model. But they point out that these measurements are less helpful when cross-border 
exposures play important roles.16 Galati and Moessner (2011) are more critical about using 
EWI models for macroprudential policy making. Since the analysis often does not reflect an 
underlying model that shows how the real economy and the financial sector interact, policy 
makers have difficulty relating the need and choice of specific regulatory steps to the results 
of an EWI model, which can reduce the transparency and accountability of macroprudential 
policy. In spite of this general critique, the IMF-FSB Early Warning Indicator Exercise of-
fers a versatile toolkit for measuring systemic risks.17 Figure 2 gives an idea how the differ-
ent indicators and models interact. 
Different versions of VAR models are also used to measure financial instability and distress. 
They are flexible forecasting tools that can trace the transmission of shocks through the 
economy and reproduce the impact of endogenous shocks to the financial sector and the 
economy. Still, they offer only stylized descriptions of financial sector’s dynamics and feed-
back to the macroeconomy.18 
Macro stress tests can be used to trace responses to large exogenous shocks throughout the 
financial system and are forward-looking (Galati / Moessner 2011). Stress tests were origi-
nally developed to test individual institutions’ resilience to financial market shocks, not to 
capture feedback effects between the financial and the real sector. More recent models also 
include macroeconomic shocks, take into account market dynamics in extreme scenarios, 
consider amplification effects from contagion and interconnectedness, and allow for multi-
round adverse feedback effects. Van Lelyveld (2009) describes macro stress tests as a multi-
stage process with four steps. First, the macroeconomic stress scenario must be designed. 
Then macroeconomic variables are mapped into microeconomic indicators of banks’ credit 
risk. Next, the macroeconomic model is used to project the time path of the macroeconomic 
variables under stress conditions, and the estimates are fed into the credit risk model to de-
termine the credit quality indicators under stress. Finally, an assessment must be made about 
whether the banks can withstand the potential shocks. Regulators should not only look at the 
credit loss distribution for the banking system as a whole but also investigate the risk distri-
bution throughout the system to detect risks of contagion. 
Measurement of systemic risk is less developed for the cross-sectional dimension. The 
literature discusses metrics of concentration risk within the system, network analyses on 
balance sheet cross-exposures, contingent claim analysis, joint probabilities of default 
based on equity returns or spreads of credit default swaps (CDS), and indicators of spill-
over risks.19 In addition to the great efforts by international governance institutions and 
academia, the private sector has also developed measurements of systemic risks, such as 
Merrill Lynch’s Global Financial Stress Index from or the Macro Prudential Indicators 
from Fitch Ratings. 
 
                                                            
16 In emerging markets the real exchange rate appreciation is an important indicator of financial crisis; see 
Galati and Moessner (2011). 
17 See IMF (2010) for details. 
18 A more elaborate version is a factor-augmented VAR, an example of which is presented by De Nicolò 
and Luchetta (2010), who model the joint dynamics of output growth and systemic risk. 
19 Describing these different approaches in more detail is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Figure 2: Empirical models and indicators in the IMF–FSB Early Warning Exercise 
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Source: Adopted from IMF (2010) 
So far there is no consensus about how to measure systemic risk. The best approach 
appears to be combining various measurements from diverse modeling efforts to pro-
duce a multi- faceted picture of systemic risk. The IMF systemic risk ‘dashboard’ 
(IMF 2011b, 21) is an integrated monitoring system that combines a number of ap-
proaches (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: An illustrative example of systemic risk monitoring (systemic risk ‘dashboard’) 
The IMF “systemic risk dashboard” aims to cover key risk categories and approaches, distinguishing 
between the likelihood of shocks and their potential impacts, as well as between high and low frequency 
monitoring tools. For each dimension, it proposes to rely on one or two specific analytical tools that are 
identified as the most robust and useful from an early warning perspective. Importantly, such a system 
needs to be tailored to individual countries’ circumstances – reflecting aspects such as the degree of 
market development and data availability – and should be revisited and updated over time. 
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Note: CCA stands for Contingent Claims Analysis; JPod = Joint Probability of Distress; BSI = Banking Stability Indicator; EDF = 
Expected Default Frequency; SIFI = Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
Source: Adopted from IMF (2011b) 
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3.2 Instruments 
Although many proposals have been made for macroprudential instruments, there is no 
consensus regarding their definition, mode of application, classification, and relevance. 
We start by defining macroprudential instruments and their mode of application, and 
attempt to classify the various instruments. 
The IMF (2011b) defines macroprudential instruments as instruments that are either spe-
cifically tailored to mitigate the time-varying or cross-sectional dimensions of systemic 
risk, or are not specifically developed for systemic risk but explicitly and specifically 
target systemic risk. For the latter, the IMF requires that the institutional framework be 
underpinned by governance arrangements to prevent misuse. Other authors (Gala-
ti / Moessner 2011; CGFS 2010) point out that the macroprudential toolkit includes (mi-
cro)prudential instruments with a “macro lens”20 as well as other complementary in-
struments from quite diverse policy fields, such as monetary and fiscal policy, capital 
account management, and market and infrastructure policies, and are used to support 
financial stability. 
IMF (2011b) considers that a macroprudential tool should effectively mitigate systemic 
risks, allow for limited arbitrage across regulations and borders, aim at the roots of the 
systemic risk problem by changing the behaviour of economic agents, and distort the 
financial system and economy as little as possible.21  
The literature intensively discusses the application of macroprudential instruments. Im-
plementing an instrument as a rule22 enhances the accountability and transparency of 
macroprudential policy. Borio and Shim (2007) argue that “built-in stabilizers” leave 
less room for policy error and act as effective pre-commitment devices since they do not 
require continuous justification by the authorities. Automatic stabilizers can influence 
economic behaviour ex ante and encourage more prudent behaviour. However, when 
instruments are used as discretionary measures, they can be fine-tuned to specific finan-
cial imbalances, which by their very nature occur infrequently and vary in intensity and 
other characteristics. Temporary measures may also be less subject to avoidance.23 
The Group of 30 (2010) raise another interesting point by distinguishing between varia-
ble and fixed approaches to implementing macroprudential instruments. In a variable 
approach, macroprudential instruments have adjustable parameters that change depend-
ing on macroprudential indicators that fluctuate during the economic cycle. This ap-
proach is best for combating pro-cyclical tendencies and network risk resulting from the 
                                                            
20 Galati and Moessner (2011) present numerous fields of prudential regulation that can be used for 
macroprudential purposes: risk measurement methodologies, financial reporting, regulatory capital, 
funding liquidity standards, collateral arrangements, risk concentration limits, compensation schemes, 
profit distribution restrictions, insurance mechanisms, and resolution regimes. 
21 Comparable views on desirable features are found in Bank of England (2009), G30 (2010), and CGFS 
(2010). 
22 Galati and Moessner (2011) name loan loss provisions, capital requirements, loan-to-value ratios, con-
tingent capital and risk management practices as rule-based macroprudential instruments. 
23 Besides quantitative adjustments to various tools, Borio and Shim (2007) also categorized warnings 
from authorities and supervisory review pressure as discretionary instruments. 
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economic cycle. A ‘fixed approach’ to the development of macroprudential instruments 
helps the policy maker make the financial system more resilient to systemic risk at all 
times. 
Besides these more general aspects, the literature further distinguishes instruments by 
policy field, type of institution or activity (e.g., banks, deposit taking, credit provision), 
type of regulation (e.g., quantity or price24), the focus of regulation (e.g., leverage, li-
quidity, capital (Lim et al. 2011)) and many other criteria. Figure 4 presents a classifica-
tion that focuses first on the dimension of systemic risk and then looks at the systemic 
risk problem to be tackled by macroprudential regulation, which appears to be a very 
reasonable approach. The literature commonly discusses two dimensions of systemic 
risk: the time and cross-sectional dimension. Since many financial transactions are 
cross-border, this dimension is also included. 
When systemic risks develop over time, there are two main issues. On one hand, exces-
sive credit expansion or asset price booms can lead to a build-up of systemic risk in the 
aggregate. On the other hand, amplification mechanisms fuel pro-cyclicality that can 
destabilise financial intermediation and increase system-wide risks. 
In cases of excessive credit expansion and asset price booms, the literature suggests lim-
iting credit quantity or credit growth by imposing respective ceilings or by reducing the 
demand for – or the supply of – credit. Caps on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios 
can lower demand. When asset prices are rising, loan-to-value ratios might be less effec-
tive than debt-to-income ratios, because collateral values (house prices) also rise. All 
measures that render credit extension more costly for financial intermediaries can de-
crease supply. These include reserve requirements and increases in minimum capital 
requirements (FSB / IMF / BIS 2011b; IMF 2011c; Crowe et al. 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al. 
2012). If credit is mainly extended to one sector such as property investment and devel-
opment, it could be helpful to use sector-dependent asset risk weights to calculate capital 
requirements. 
Because the degree of procyclicality is one driving factor of systemic risk in the finan-
cial sector in the ongoing crisis, many of the proposed macroprudential instruments deal 
with differing approaches to reduce financial sector cyclicality. All of these instruments 
share to be calibrated on some measure of the financial cycle. 
Since leverage influences the amplification mechanism and therefore cyclicality, many 
instruments aim to restrict leverage. This can either be done by increasing equity capital, 
especially countercyclically, or by reducing the cyclicality in the valuation of collateral. 
The literature suggests dynamic or forward-looking provisions, countercyclical capital 
surcharges25 on the aggregate or sector level,26 restrictions on profit distributions, higher 
                                                            
24 For a brief discussion see Galati and Moessner (2011) or CGFS (2010). 
25 A variation of higher capital requirements is calculating the capital requirement with regard to the 
maximum of current and lagged assets; see Hanson / Kashyap / Stein (2011). 
26 Bank of England (2009) notes that when specific capital surcharges are applied, flexibility is traded off 
for simplicity of application. 
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quality capital, contingent capital27, and higher capital requirements for the trading book 
and off-balance-sheet positions. For the latter time-varying variations in margins and 
haircuts, through-the-cycle valuations of collateral, time-varying loan-to-value and debt-
to-income ratios, and changed risk management practices (measuring risk through the 
cycle instead of at one point in time) are proposed. 
Maturity mismatch is another driving force of cyclicality whose proposed remedies in-
clude liquidity requirements to limit the underpricing of roll-over risks in funding mar-
kets and market liquidity risks in assets markets. Liquidity requirements can take the 
form of quantity and ratio restrictions or they render maturity mismatches more expen-
sive. Among the former are minimum liquidity coverage ratios, limits on maturity mis-
match, limits on net open currency positions, and core-funding ratios; examples of the 
latter are liquidity buffers tied to maturity mismatches, a levy on non-core liabilities, and 
capital surcharges for maturity mismatches. 
From a cross-sectional perspective, there are contagion and fire-sale risks due to inter-
connectedness and common exposures, risks posed by SIFIs, and structural vulnerabili-
ties caused by market conduct and the financial market infrastructure. Macroprudential 
instruments of the cross-sectional dimension can either target the size and balance sheet 
structure of financial institutions or change the framework of transactions to make the 
system more resilient. Because of large information deficiencies regarding cross-
sectional systemic risk, there is much discussion about introducing broad disclosure re-
quirements on common exposures, common risk factors, and interconnectedness. 
With regard to interconnectedness risk, macroprudential liquidity surcharges aim to re-
duce the complexities of bank funding markets and shorten intra-financial-system lend-
ing chains, thereby reducing counterparty risk and liquidity hoarding in a crisis. Liability 
limits for example by introducing limits on interbank exposure or higher liquidity re-
quirements for inter-financial sector exposures can be used to weaken interconnected-
ness. To reduce the risk of common exposures, Basel III already includes higher capital 
requirements for trading and derivative activities, complex securitisations, and off-
balance-sheet exposures. Moreover, liquidity requirements for wholesale funding will be 
introduced.28 A fire-sale externality emerges when a financial institution decides to 
mainly finance its assets with short-term debt. It fails to internalise its inability to roll-
over short-term debt that forces it to liquidate assets in a crisis, thereby imposing fire-
sale costs on other financial firms holding the same asset – that then have to watch their 
own collateral lose value. For such cases, Hanson / Kashyap / Stein (2011) recommend 
regulating debt maturity to reduce systemic risks and imposing similar standards for a 
given type of credit exposures, no matter who ultimately holds them. Another helpful 
tool requires posting higher margins for repo transactions in order to attenuate the 
forced-selling mechanism and the vicious spiral it unleashes.29 
 
                                                            
27 Contingent capital can pre-wire a recapitalisation and take the form of contingent convertibles, capital 
insurance or bonus holdbacks; see Hanson / Kashyap / Stein (2011). 
28 See FSB / IMF / BIS (2011a) and compare with IMF (2011b). 
29 For the theoretical underpinnings of this suggestion, see also Kashyap / Berner / Goodhart (2011). 
  
Figure 4: Macroprudential instruments 
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Figure 4 (cont.): Macroprudential instruments 
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The internationally agreed framework for SIFIs foresees regulatory changes to increase 
the loss absorption capacity by imposing institution-specific systemic capital surcharg-
es,30 calibrate deposit insurance premiums according to systemic risk, facilitate orderly 
restructurings, call for more intensive and effective supervisory oversight and interna-
tional standards for resolution plans. Restrictions could also be made regarding permis-
sible activities for systemic institutions (FSB / IMF / BIS 2011a; Bank of England 
2009). In addition, the G30 (2010) proposes higher capital requirements in the form of 
multipliers with regard to systemic importance and macro stress tests for SIFIs. An al-
ternative macroprudential instrument for dealing with SIFIs could be size-dependent 
leverage limits or size-dependent asset risk-weights. 
During the global financial crisis, the market conduct regarding over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives and securities trading was blamed for liquidity freezes and problems caused 
by fire sales. Tools to alleviate information frictions include: increased product standard-
ization, centralised clearing houses, organised platform-trading and greater pre- and 
post-trade transparency. Margining practices should be stable throughout the cycle and 
margins and haircuts should be calibrated to include periods of stressed markets. The 
IMF (2011b) argues for supporting the use of central counterparties through strong in-
centives: Higher capital charges for derivatives trading could be imposed if central coun-
terparties were not used. The Bank of England (2009) stated that the creation of central 
counterparties for reasonably liquid market instruments should be complemented by 
centralised risk management and oversight because concentrating respective risk expo-
sures within them could create a new source of systemic risk. 
Macroprudential regulations must be consistent across borders in order to limit cross-
border spillover and arbitrage. One instrument for enhancing consistency is the principle 
of jurisdictional reciprocity. Basel III states that any banks exposed to several jurisdic-
tions must hold a capital buffer that reflects the composition of a bank’s domestic and 
international exposures. The host authority will activate the buffer for international ex-
posures while the home authority has the option of imposing a higher buffer but may not 
impose a lower one (FSB / IMF / BIS 2011b). If such an international agreement is not 
in reach, the Bank of England (2009) proposes a subsidiarisation of different geographic 
branches of cross-border financial firms in order to reduce cross-country spillovers. 
Since currency risks and capital flows create specific risks for the financial sector, the 
literature also discusses appropriate macroprudential instruments. Where foreign capital 
inflows cause excessive credit growth or asset price booms, instruments similar to those 
presented above for slowing credit extension are proposed – for example, caps on for-
eign currency lending, differentiated reserve requirements for foreign currency, unremu-
nerated reserve requirements for non-residents, and taxes on capital flows. Where capital 
inflows are a source of short-term financing, various authors have proposed instruments 
similar to those for fighting maturity mismatch and leverage. These include limits on net 
open currency positions and minimum holding periods for capital inflows. Limits to cur-
rency mismatch could be useful where risk results from exchange rate volatility. 
 
                                                            
30 The IMF (2011b) makes similar suggestions. 
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3.3 Institutional arrangements and mandate 
A very dynamic market environment challenges macroprudential financial market regula-
tion. The urge to exploit profitable opportunities pushes the financial sector to continuous-
ly evolve – sometimes very rapidly. New types of financial institutions and financial activ-
ities develop from the constant search for returns, and these can create new sources of sys-
temic risk. Macroprudential policy making must be able to respond flexibly to the chang-
ing financial market. According to Nier (2011) such a dynamic system requires macropru-
dential policy makers to have three types of powers:  
- information collection, 
- designation, and 
- calibration. 
In order to assess the entire financial sector, a macroprudential policy maker must have 
the right to collect information from all providers of financial intermediation services. 
Information of interest includes exposures to financial instruments or other institutions, 
business models, and levels of leverage. Such information can be requested directly 
from financial intermediaries. Alternatively, the macroprudential policy maker has must 
rely on available information from supervisors or commercial data warehouses. 
Designation powers allow the macroprudential policy maker to vary the scope of regula-
tion in order to ensure that all systemically important institutions are regulated and su-
pervised. The G30 (2010) argue that the institutions and markets to be regulated by the 
macroprudential policy maker should be selected according to their potential to create 
systemic risks. Effective macroprudential regulation should ensure that risk flows to 
those institutions best equipped to bear it.31 Systemic risk has time and cross-sectional 
dimension. The build-up of systemic risks as a result of amplification mechanisms be-
comes a macroprudential concern when a large group of institutions is affected. Nier 
(2011) terms such groups of institutions “collectively systemic”, emphasising that they 
certainly need to be within the scope of macroprudential regulation irrespective of their 
legal form. Since single financial institutions can become of systemic concern because 
of their size, interconnectedness, complexity, lack of substitutability or global scope,32 
individually systemic institutions also need to be brought within the scope of the macro-
prudential regulator. 
Calibration powers enable the macroprudential policy maker to adjust regulatory instru-
ments according to changing risk levels over time and across firms. Ideally, a macropru-
dential framework would calibrate the requirements conditionally based on the level of 
systemic risk, and set appropriate rules. Because of the dynamic nature of the financial 
sector and systemic risks and the resulting uncertainties, rules need to be complemented 
by judgement, using all available information. 
Nier et al. (2011) discuss the main characteristics of institutional arrangements of 
macroprudential regulation: ownership of macroprudential policy, the separation of poli-
                                                            
31 This approach would include regulating the ‘shadow banking sector’, as requested by many other au-
thors, e.g., Bank of England (2009), FSB / IMF / BIS (2011b), and Hanson / Kashyap / Stein (2011). 
32 See BCBS (2011) for how to assess systemically important financial institutions. 
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cy decisions from control over policy instruments, the existence of a separate body that 
coordinates policies to address systemic risk, the degree of institutional integration of 
central bank and financial regulatory functions. They also classify various institutional 
set-ups. See Figure 5 for a more detailed presentation of the characteristics. 
Macroprudential policy ownership, which includes appointing a specific institution and 
giving it a clear mandate, defining the objectives, and ensuring accountability, must be 
clarified. The strong powers needed to effectively implement macroprudential regulation 
entail the risks of misuse and excessive discretionary use, requiring a strong mandate to 
define the objectives and set the limits. The IMF (2011b) argues that the primary objec-
tive of macroprudential regulation is to safeguard financial stability. Any secondary ob-
jective should ensure that the macroprudential policy maker is aware of the possible 
costs to the economy of overly restrictive macroprudential regulation. Lowering the lev-
el of systemic risk in the economy increases the burden on financial services providers 
to comply with the regulations. Higher costs of regulatory compliance can result in a 
lower level of financial services being provided to the economy, so a useful secondary 
objective might be maintaining a level of financial services conducive to the economy’s 
balanced growth.33 Since the benefits of macroprudential policies – reductions in the 
probability and severity of financial crises – are long-term and not easily measured, 
while the costs of adverse effects on the profitability of financial intermediaries and the 
availability of financial services to households and firms are immediately visible, there 
is strong bias towards inaction. Financial market participants will try to lobby against 
macroprudential regulation and political interference is a given, but the regulator is 
shielded from these pressures by significant institutional independence. Mechanisms for 
accountability should guard against incompetence and abuses of power. Since the out-
come of successful macroprudential regulation cannot be precisely measured, communi-
cating decisions and their justifications to the public clearly helps insure accountability, 
which can be supported by annual reports and periodic reviews of the framework. The 
effectiveness and accountability of macroprudential policy can be enhanced through risk 
warnings and assessments; greater transparency of the internal decision-making process-
es can be ensured by publishing minutes or voting results. 
Second, a decision must be made about whether policy making and policy implementa-
tion are to be combined under one roof or if it would be better to have an institutional 
separation of policy decisions from control over policy instruments. From a political 
economy perspective, the mandate and powers must be aligned to create a successful 
macroprudential policy, which means that the mandate holder has to have the tools 
(powers). Nier (2011) develops the notion that the macroprudential policy maker either 
has to have direct power (control) over specific regulatory instruments of macropruden-
tial regulation or the power to direct other policy makers, such as the microprudential 
supervisory authority. 
The macroprudential policy maker’s influence over other authorities’ actions (power to 
direct) could come from an informal exchange of views in a purely consensual approach. 
It can be further enhanced by the requirement for formal consultations. 
 
                                                            
33 Alternatively and additionally, other stakeholders can be taken into account should systemic risk miti-
gation conflict with their interests; see Nier (2011) and IMF (2011b). 
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Figure 5: Characteristics of institutional models for macroprudential policy 
 
Source:  Adapted from Nier et al. (2011) 
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the close institutional integration of the macroprudential policy maker and the main pru-
dential agency. The macroprudential authority then functions as the governance body for 
all prudential actions, ensuring that microprudential policy serves the overarching objec-
tive of mitigating systemic risk. 
Ownership of macroprudential
policy
Ownership indicates which institution 
(or set of institutions) should be held 
accountable for limiting systemic risk.
Degree of institutional integration of 
central bank and financial 
regulatory functions
Institutional integration affects the 
extent to which coordination  of central 
bank and financial regulatory functions 
occur “under one roof” or across 
agencies.
Role of treasury
The formal role of the treasurycan be 
(i) active, if it plays a leading role in 
policymaking or coordinating 
committees; (ii) passive, if the treasury 
participates in such committees, but 
has no special role; (iii) simply 
nonexistent.
Institutional separation of policy 
decisions from control over policy 
instruments
This arises when policy decision and 
policy implementation rest with 
different bodies or institutions.
Existence of a separate body 
coordinating across policies to 
address systemic risk
A coordinating committee can promote 
a common understanding of risks and 
contribute to consistency responses 
across agencies.
Institutional model for macroprudential regulation
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Particular emphasis should be placed on developing the role of the central bank.34 Because 
of their roles in monetary policy and payments system oversight, as well as their function 
as lender of last resort, central banks bring extensive expertise to macroprudential policy 
making. A central bank also has strong incentives to support effective macroprudential 
regulation and policy because when systemic risks are contained, it can concentrate on its 
price stability mandate and reduce the probability that if systemic risks increase, the 
monetary policy maker will be asked to use its monetary policy instruments to ‘lean 
against the financial cycle’ or engage in ‘cleaning’ – should there be a financial crisis. 
However, monetary and macroprudential policy should have different governance frame-
works since their mandates and objectives differ.  
3.4 Coordination of national and international policies and cooperation of policy 
institutions 
There is great debate about how much macroprudential regulation should be coordinated 
at the regional and international levels, and the role of international policy institutions in 
supporting and enforcing macroprudential policy cooperation has not yet been clarified. 
On one hand, international coordination can limit spillovers and regulatory arbitrage 
across borders, which is beneficial for the financial stability environment. On the other 
hand, national policy makers must have sufficient flexibility when framing macropruden-
tial policy making to be able to accommodate a country’s conditions and circumstances. 
Knowledge remains limited about how to design and implement macroprudential tools. At 
the international level, this is especially complex because the channels that transmit risk 
and financial instability are not fully understood and the interplay of domestic and global 
stability has not yet been investigated.35 
Nier (2011) emphasises that besides reducing the scope for international arbitrage and 
containing the spillover risks by systemically important institutions with cross-border ac-
tivities, international and regional coordination can also help stimulate national policy 
makers to act. International policy institutions can offer useful instruments for coordina-
tion, such as minimum standards, as well as guidance and surveillance of national action. 
CGFS (2010) states that there is a “fairness” problem in applying macroprudential regula-
tion across borders, where it is difficult to establish a level-playing field since financial 
cycles are not synchronised and macroprudential measures cannot be applied equally at 
the same time.36 CGFS (2010) advocates close international cooperation to enhance do-
mestic resilience to financial shocks, viewing a coordinated approach to leaning against 
the cycle as more difficult. 
The Group of 30 (2010) is also rather skeptical regarding the benefits of international co-
ordination, arguing that the lack of strong national supervision clearly contributed more to 
                                                            
34 For the role of the treasury, see IMF (2011b) or Nier (2011). 
35 Bruno and Shin (2013) present early empirical evidence on how global financial conditions impact 
capital flows to Korea and a comparative sample of 48 advanced and emerging economies. 
36 Ensuring fairness in the home market will be easier to reach. One way for the macroprudential policy 
maker to ensure fairness would be to broadly apply the principles across differing types of institutions. 
Foreign financial institutions could then be brought into scope by local incorporation or ‘subsidiarisation’. 
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the global crisis than any lack of international coordination and cooperation. They put 
forward that a primary goal of macroprudential policy should be to enhance the resilience 
of local regimes. Only national governments can apply fiscal resources to resolve a finan-
cial crisis, and policy makers do not yet fully understand how macroprudential policies 
function across borders. In an effort to prevent a “race to the bottom”, the G30 suggest 
that sharing cross-border information and coordinating supervision in order to limit arbi-
trage between strong and lax instances of national financial supervision. Early warning 
systems, international surveillance frameworks, and continuous peer review conducted by 
international organisations could be useful. 
FSB / IMF / BIS (2011b) suggest that national structural policies promote robust market 
operations and resilient market infrastructures. International harmonising principles and 
market practices by standard setters like the Committee on Payment and Settlements Sys-
tems (CPSS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) also 
help push national policy makers to act. In their view, cooperation only succeeds if strong 
institutional mechanisms lead to a common understanding of threats to global financial 
stability and appropriate policies. Multiple efforts, such as identifying common exposures, 
risk concentrations, inter-linkages within and across financial systems, and the build-up of 
macroeconomic and financial imbalances, already exist.37 
Moreover, international cooperation should ensure that the macroprudential frameworks in 
individual countries are mutually consistent. Few steps have yet been taken in this direction. 
Examples include the reciprocity principle in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion’s (BCBS) countercyclical capital buffers and the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) 
arrangements for global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).  
4 Implications for developing and emerging market economies 
Since the global financial crisis originated in the advanced economies where its conse-
quences were most strongly felt, it is normal that the debate on macroprudential regulation 
has focused mainly on the needs of the North American and European economies, and that 
regulatory proposals have been examined primarily against the background of advanced 
economies. 
However, although developing and emerging economies were not hit as hard by the crisis 
as the advanced economies and already have experienced a strong rebound in economic 
activity, there are two main reasons to consider the implications of the crisis for financial 
market regulation in developing and emerging economies. 
First, despite fast and strong recovery from the global financial crisis, its spillover effects 
caused a severe slump in many developing and emerging economies. With a long history of 
debilitating financial crises and costs – often exceeding 10% of GDP in Latin America, and 
in some case even as much as 30% of GDP (Jacome / Nier / Imam 2012) – policy makers in 
developing and emerging economies need to carefully analyse the causes and patterns of the 
                                                            
37 Including the FSB standing committee on the assessment of vulnerabilities, IMF’s regular bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance, the IMF–FSB early warning exercise, the G20 mutual assessment process, di-
verse BIS workstreams, and CGFS monitoring. 
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ongoing crisis and start framing macroprudential financial market regulation to help their 
financial markets and real sectors better withstand such shocks. While the post-crisis re-
forms aim to ensure a more stable and resilient financial system, the trade-off in terms of 
growth is unknown. If there is a slowdown in financial intermediation and investment, 
growth could be negatively impacted and the reforms turn out to be a disproportionately 
heavy price for emerging economies undergoing structural transformation. Policy makers 
must carefully assess the impact of macroprudential financial market regulation on crucial 
drivers of economic growth such as short-term trade finance, long-term financing for infra-
structure investments, and the availability of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).38 
Second, there is a risk of being satisfied with the status quo and overlooking risks to finan-
cial stability. According to De Gregorio (2010): “It is tempting to think that emerging econ-
omies did not suffer the financial crisis for having better regulatory framework than indus-
trial ones. In some way, emerging markets enjoyed also less complexities and smaller sized 
financial systems.” While financial market regulation might appear appropriate for the cur-
rent level of development, financial sectors – in particular in emerging economies – have 
robust growth records in both scale and scope. Should their financial markets further devel-
op, higher levels of systemic risk could be created, like in advanced economies. The chal-
lenge is to allow financial development to continue within a solid financial system. De Gre-
gorio (2010) stresses the importance of learning from policy and regulatory mistakes in 
more mature markets, and analysing and participating in changes in the global financial 
landscape. 
4.1 Sources of systemic risks: relevant markets and financial institutions 
In developing economies, systemic risk results, first, from a lower level of financial de-
velopment in scale and scope, second, from specific characteristics of the banking sector 
which often show up in developing economies, and, third, from typical features of the 
country’s economic structure. 
The financial systems of developing and emerging economies are often characterised by a 
relatively low level of development and strong dominance of the banking sector. Debt 
markets, except for the sovereign debt market, play minor roles. The corporate sector 
normally does not rely on corporate debt or commercial paper for refinancing and uses 
internal funds or bank credit instead. Stock markets are of less importance, since many 
firms in developing countries are state- or family-owned and do not issue equity. Only in 
East Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, are real property asset markets relevant 
because housing is seen as an attractive asset for investment (Agenor / Pereira 2010; De 
Gregorio 2010; Moreno 2011; Park 2011; Jacome / Nier / Imam 2012; Pereira / Harris 
2012; Shin 2012). Market segments in which derivatives and securitised instruments are 
traded are at best underdeveloped. As a consequence, fewer types of financial services are 
offered, but there are also fewer opaque and complex off-balance-sheet instruments avail-
                                                            
38 See Sinha (2012) for a detailed discussion. 
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able39 than in advanced economies, so that systemic risk stemming from this source is not 
a big issue. 
The financial development of some regions has been hampered by low saving rates.40 
Generally, thin financial markets pose more systemic risks because market volatility is 
typically higher and financial assets are less reliable as collateral. There are also greater 
risks of market manipulation.41 When fewer asset classes are available for diversification, 
the local banking sector and other economic agents are more dependent on the sovereign 
debt market for liquid securities. A negative side effect of large sovereign-debt holdings 
with regard to systemic risk is the build-up of strong, widespread common exposure to 
public finances and political risk. Many sovereign paper holdings in the financial sector, 
combined with an erosion of confidence, could threaten financial stability.42 Given the 
potential systemic risks that stem from this common exposure, macroprudential policy 
should aim at establishing a diversified bond market. 
Banking markets in developing economies are driven by commercial, public, and foreign 
banks, which are the main source of credit and still follow the ‘originate-to-hold’ princi-
ple. Other types of financial intermediaries, considered to be the ‘shadow-banking’ sector, 
play no decisive role. Although few non-bank financial intermediaries exist, Cor-
reira / Jimenez / Manuelito (2009) emphasise that in Latin America unregulated lending 
institutions have grown large enough to become sources of systemic risk. For example, 
credit cards issued by department stores and supermarkets, which are not defined as finan-
cial institutions, have become a major source of credit, particularly for lower-income seg-
ments. Risk comes from possible interruptions in the payments chain, and heightens the 
more credit cards are used as payment instruments. ‘Mobile banking’, in which payments 
are made with mobile phones supported by local telecom agencies, might also give cause 
for concern. Macroprudential policy makers should consider bringing these companies 
into the scope of regulation. 
Many banking systems in developing economies are dominated by just a few banks. When 
a market is dominated by a few similar institutions, the risk that market participants will 
simultaneously move in the same direction can be greater. Systemic risks can also develop 
because of systemically important financial institutions.43 In such circumstances, SIFI-
related macroprudential regulation should have high priority. 
Foreign banks are major players in many developing and emerging economies. In Eastern 
Europe their average market share is 60%, in Latin America 20%,44 in East Asia 10%, and 
in the Middle East and Africa less than 10%. In Latin America, most lending is handled by 
local subsidiaries of foreign banks, most of them Spanish. When crises have originated in 
                                                            
39 Gopinath (2011) emphasises that the Indian financial system is less complex than most developed mar-
kets because many complex, high-risk products either are not permitted or are regulated. 
40 See also Correira / Jimenez / Manuelito (2009). 
41 For Africa, see Jeanneau (2012). 
42 See also Correira / Jimenez / Manuelito (2009). 
43 The presence of large public banks in several Latin American countries is an additional vulnerability. 
Public banks have more than 40% market share in several countries, e.g., Brazil and Costa Rica; see 
Jacome / Nier / Imam (2012). 
44 The market share of foreign banks varies greatly throughout Latin America, but can be as high as 70% 
(Mexico); see Jacome / Nier / Imam (2012) for more details. 
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emerging markets, foreign banks had mainly a stabilising role in these economies. How-
ever, in the ongoing global crisis, instead of absorbing local shocks, foreign banks may 
have transmitted foreign shocks to the domestic economy. Macroprudential policy must 
acknowledge that shocks to parent-bank economies can cause aggregate credit shock in 
the domestic banking sector of developing and emerging economies. 
For a regulator, it also matters whether the foreign banks operate as foreign branches or 
foreign subsidiaries. Foreign branches are subject to home-country supervision, meaning 
that if the parent bank fails, inadequate resolution mechanisms for cross-border financial 
institutions could create systemic risks. Developing international standards for cross-
border resolution mechanisms should have high priority in macroprudential policy mak-
ing for countries with many branches of foreign banks. 
If foreign subsidiaries and local banks finance themselves almost exclusively out of lo-
cal deposits, the banking system will remain relatively robust when faced with tempo-
rary liquidity dry-ups. Latin American banking markets are good examples since they 
are characterised by high deposit-to-loan ratios and limited cross-border lending 
(Jacome / Nier / Imam 2012). If the local deposit base is small, domestic short-term 
wholesale funding can lead to a larger maturity mismatch on bank balance sheets. With 
foreign sources of wholesale financing,45 cross-border exposures and shocks can lead to 
common exposures and negative spillover effects in the domestic market that also in-
crease systemic risk. These risks are much more pronounced in East Asian than in other 
developing economies. Macroprudential regulation in East Asia should rely on instru-
ments to limit or reduce maturity mismatch. 
Park (2011) notes that in emerging economies, banks that are active in international fi-
nancial intermediation are vulnerable to another serious risk: currency mismatch. Cur-
rency mismatch occurs when local currency lending is financed by borrowing in foreign 
currencies. Banks commit this mismatch because long-term relationship lending assumes 
that loans will be rolled over. Macroprudential regulation could mitigate these risks by 
restricting the scope of banks’ asset-liability management. Such regulation would most 
likely undermine banks’ competitiveness in international financial intermediation with 
regard to their counterparts from advanced or reserve currency countries. Such macro-
prudential measures can be expected to stimulate heavy lobbying. 
High financial dollarization, not only in the financial sector but also at firms and in 
households, heightens countries’ exposure to the effects of currency depreciations and 
can amplify financial stress. 
Another source of systemic risks in developing and emerging economies results from 
more severe asymmetric information problems. Less reliable accounting frameworks and 
standards and opaque SMEs make it harder for banks to monitor their borrowers. This 
leads to more collateralised lending at relatively short maturities, which strongly in-
creases the pro-cyclicality of lending. An appropriate macroprudential policy might fos-
ter stronger accounting rules and frameworks. Individual financial agents lack infor-
mation to assess market risks that are caused by credit concentration at an aggregate lev-
                                                            
45 Besides wholesale funding from foreign sources, foreign lending can be effected through direct cross-
border lending. 
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el, so credit extension is often concentrated in certain market segments, especially prop-
erty (residential and commercial), which leads to overinvestment in these sectors and 
potential asset price bubbles.46 Enhancing market transparency can help to reduce infor-
mation frictions. 
In addition, many developing and emerging economies still rely on exporting commodi-
ties, so they are vulnerable to terms of trade shocks and the adverse effects of highly 
volatile commodity prices. Such shocks can weaken the real economy and lead to lower 
loan-repayment rates that weaken the financial sector. Macroprudential policy makers 
must pay attention to this source of common exposures. 
4.2 Macroprudential policy framework 
Relation to other macroeconomic policies 
Just as in advanced economies, there are strong links between macroeconomic and 
financial stability in developing and emerging economies. In particular, monetary and 
fiscal policies impact the macroprudential policy field. The ongoing crisis has shown 
that sustainable fiscal policies are important for safeguarding sovereign debt and 
avoiding adverse feedback loops between sovereign risk and the financial system. This 
is particularly true for the thin financial markets found in many developing countries 
where government debt securities are among the few liquid debt instruments. When a 
systemic risk build-up is driven by a consumption boom accompanied by strong capital 
inflows and persistent current account deficits, macroprudential policy will be insuffi-
cient to sustain systemic stability: the underlying macroeconomic problems must be 
solved first. 
The strongest complementarities are between monetary and macroprudential policies. 
Park (2011) indicates that most macroprudential instruments that lean against the finan-
cial cycle function through changes in the availability of sectoral and aggregate credit. 
Macroprudential tools affect bank lending, but changes in bank loans also cause changes 
in investment and consumer spending. In emerging economies where the banking system 
dominates financial intermediation, with regard to the channel of policy transmission, 
macroprudential policy aimed at controlling pro-cyclicality in bank lending and mone-
tary policy that targets price stability are one and the same, but they have different ob-
jectives. In small open economies that are suffering inflationary shocks, interest rate 
changes may be necessary, but may also dramatically affect capital flows so that they 
contribute to excessive financial risk. Macroprudential policy makers must ensure that 
monetary and macroprudential policies successfully complement each other – through 
close coordination.47 
Many developing and emerging economies operate under more or less fixed-exchange-
rate regimes. In this case, monetary policy instruments are not available: for example, 
monetary policy makers have no interest rate tool to lean against the financial cycle. As 
                                                            
46 See also Correira / Jimenez / Manuelito (2009) for other problems. For example, banks can be highly 
exposed to the risk of major customers going bankrupt or lending to related parties. 
47 In this context, see also De Gregorio (2011). 
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a consequence, policy-makers must exclusively rely on adapted microprudential or 
‘modern’ macroprudential tools to mitigate systemic risks and foster financial stability.48 
Hence, macroprudential policy has a more prominent role to play and the policy frame-
work should be developed accordingly. 
Institutional arrangements 
There are many challenges to creating macroprudential policy frameworks in emerging 
and developing economies, four of which are described below. The first two are related 
to regional characteristics and the last two touch on problems also shared by policy 
makers in advanced economies but that are more urgent in emerging and developing 
economies. 
First, a country’s effective macroprudential framework is established against the histori-
cal and institutional background of monetary policy and financial supervision. The Latin 
American case illustrates this problem, as explained by Jacome / Nier / Imam (2012). In 
the region, institutional foundations for financial stability have deep roots. The integra-
tion – or separation – of responsibilities between central banks, financial regulators, and 
supervisors has remained unchanged since the respective agencies were created in the 
1920s and 1930s. Financial stability often is not an explicit objective in Latin America, 
either for central banks or financial supervision agencies. Central banks focus on price 
stability; supervision authorities are responsible for consumer protection. Only recently 
have some countries introduced new legislation to strengthen institutional underpinnings 
for macroprudential policies. This contrasts with the experience in Asia and Europe 
where several countries had reformed their institutional frameworks for financial stabil-
ity in the last 20 years, often following financial crises. Latin American constitutions 
usually set the mandates and powers of central banks and supervisory agencies, so it is 
more difficult to change existing institutional arrangements regarding financial stability. 
In addition, in some countries, the central bank law has precedence over other legisla-
tion, meaning that a qualified legislative majority may be required to approve amend-
ments. To sum up, the Latin American institutional and legal background makes the suc-
cessful and timely implementation of a macroprudential policy framework much more 
difficult than in other regions. The macroprudential governance structure must be 
adapted to these circumstances. 
Second, financial systems in developing countries and emerging economies depend 
much more on credit intermediation by foreign banks, cross-border lending, foreign cur-
rency funding in wholesale markets, and relatively volatile capital flows than those in 
developed economies. As a consequence, systemic risk to the financial sector always has 
an international component, and regulatory arbitrage and consistency of macroprudential 
policy across borders is an important part of the discussion. Also, given the strong pres-
ence of international banking groups and the expanding web of intra-regional banking 
relationships in developing countries, careful thought must be given to coordinating with 
outside regulators, in such areas as cross-border consolidated supervision.49 This is par-
ticularly important for policy makers in Emerging Europe and Latin America, and to a 
                                                            
48 For a more detailed discussion, see Moreno (2011). 
49 See also Delgado and Meza (2011). 
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lesser degree in Africa. An effective framework for macroprudential policy must include 
bi- and multilateral coordination and cooperation mechanisms to enhance financial stabil-
ity at home and at the regional level. 
Third, in developing countries microprudential oversight and regulation are often less ma-
ture than in advanced countries: setting up a macroprudential policy framework could 
overburden regulatory agencies and governance frameworks. According to the assess-
ments of Beck et al. (2011), although banking sector reform and regulation has made most 
banking systems in Africa stable and well capitalized, banking sector oversight is poor. 
Supervisory processes focus on compliance with regulatory standards but do not identify 
or manage changing risks in the financial system, and monitoring is hampered by insuffi-
cient data and reporting processes. Beck et al. conclude that more complex supervisory 
arrangements will not provide an adequate framework to enhance financial stability unless 
the supervisory capacity is first strengthened: the macroprudential framework follows. 
Fourth, there are many arguments in favour of the central bank playing an important role 
in maintaining financial stability. However, wherever central bank autonomy is not well 
established, new financial stability mandates can create pretexts for political interference, 
rendering the monetary policy institution less independent. Furthermore, instead of cor-
recting inappropriate fiscal and other macroeconomic policies, governments may pressure 
the authorities to use macro- and microprudential tools. Therefore it might be preferable to 
enhance the central bank’s governance before adding more complex policy making to its 
mandate.50 Since a developing economy’s financial system plays a substantive role in fi-
nancing sustainable growth and macroprudential financial market regulation is viewed as 
potentially leading to a reduction of financial services for the economy, it could be im-
portant to specify a secondary objective of macroprudential policy such as “maintaining a 
level of financial services conducive to the balanced growth of the economy” as a way of 
clearly identifying trade-offs between the costs and benefits of macroprudential financial 
market regulation. This might help increase the acceptance and accountability of macro-
prudential policy. 
Indicators 
The literature on the measurement of systemic risk views the deviation of the credit-to-
GDP ratio from its trend as reliable leading indicator for financial sector systemic risks; 
several international policy organisations agree. However, Sinha (2012) and Pereira and 
Harris (2012) cast doubt that this indicator is useful for emerging economies that are un-
dergoing rapid structural changes. For them, the upward deviation of the credit-to-GDP 
metric from the trend does not necessarily result from a build-up of systemic risk. The 
trend also includes structural components, so it is more difficult to identify periods of ex-
cessive credit growth. In addition, Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2012) show that not all credit 
booms end in a bust, they may result from better fundamentals, and loan growth can con-
tribute to healthy financial deepening. Hahm et al. (2012) and Shin (2012) argue that in 
developing and emerging economies, the banking sector finances excessive asset or credit 
growth, concluding that policy makers should observe how banks fund their assets and 
                                                            
50 See Jeanneau (2011) for a detailed proposal of how African central banks could make macroprudential 
policy. 
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pay special attention to the liability side of the balance sheets. In emerging economies, 
funding vulnerabilities often stem from reliance on unstable short-term funding and short-
term foreign currency funding. Measuring such liabilities could be a useful indicator of 
systemic risk. Big increases in credit should not be used as the unique indicator for sys-
temic risk in developing and emerging economies. Instead, systemic risk analysis should 
also include indicators to explain the macroeconomic and financial stability environments, 
such as external imbalances, exposures to currency risks, asset prices, and funding struc-
tures. 
Instruments 
Many emerging and developing economies have had recurrent financial crises in the con-
text of pronounced boom-and-bust cycles. Jacome / Nier / Imam (2012) note that several 
countries in Latin America began to recognise that traditional financial regulation ignored 
a key dimension of financial stability, namely the interplay of macroeconomic perfor-
mance and the stability of financial institutions. They introduced instruments that are now 
considered to be macroprudential, although some of them have also been used in monetary 
policy. Most tools in Latin America tackle the time dimension of systemic risk51 to avoid 
the potential adverse effects of rapid credit growth. 
In Latin America and in East Asia, reserve requirements are very popular. These regulato-
ry tools require banking institutions to hold a fraction of their deposits/liabilities as liquid 
reserves, usually in cash or highly liquid sovereign paper at the central bank. Size, curren-
cy denomination, duration of the holding period, and remuneration are all regulated. To-
var / Garcia-Escribano / Martin (2012) point out that reserve requirements can play a 
counter-cyclical role, contain systemic risks by improving the banking system’s funding 
structure, and serve as a tool for allocating credit to ease liquidity pressures. They can also 
be used as a complementary tool for capital requirements or bank recapitalisation when 
remunerating reserves helps to increase earnings. On the downside, reserve requirements 
constrain banks’ funding and, if remunerated below market rates, act as a tax on banks. 
Banks may respond by passing along their costs to other agents by raising the spread be-
tween lending and deposit rates, which in turn may stimulate disintermediation,52 increase 
non-bank financing, and lead to excessive risk-taking in less regulated sectors. Many poli-
cy makers in emerging economies53 are still convinced of the usefulness of reserve re-
quirements, although the empirical evidence regarding their effectiveness is rare and gen-
erally weak.54 Reserve requirements should be regarded as a blunt instrument. There are 
newer macroprudential instruments that effectively support financial stability with gener-
ally fewer costs for financial intermediation. 
                                                            
51 For example loan-to-value and debt-to-income caps on credit have been used in housing, consumer 
credit, credit card, and auto loans. Counter-cyclical dynamic provisioning is more common in Latin 
America than elsewhere. See Terrier et al. (2011) for an in-depth survey of policy instruments used in 
Latin America. 
52 Since reserve requirements only affect banks, other intermediaries are not covered by regulation; see 
De Gregorio (2010) and Hahm et al. (2012). 
53 See, e.g., Pereira and Harris (2012) for Brazil, or Sinha (2012) for India. 
54 See Tovar / Garcia-Escribano / Martin (2012) for an empirical study on the effectiveness of constrain-
ing credit to the private sector. 
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For developing and emerging economies with open capital markets, international capital 
flows play a particularly important role for financial stability, and thus have implications 
for the design of macroprudential policies.55 Foreign capital that flows into these econo-
mies in the form of short-term loans to local banks constitutes a volatile source of funding. 
Liquidity requirements for foreign short-term funding and provision policies to address the 
credit risk associated with large capital inflows could serve as macroprudential instru-
ments. Most countries discourage currency mismatches by limiting net open positions.56 In 
their empirical cross-country study of emerging market economies about whether macro-
prudential policies can enhance financial stability in the case of large capital inflows, Os-
try et al. (2012) find that foreign exchange related prudential measures can reduce the 
share of foreign exchange lending in total domestic credit, helping to reduce the propor-
tion of portfolio debt in total external liabilities. Hahm et al. (2012) suggest using loan-to-
deposit caps, which are suited for restraining excessive asset growth and the growth of 
non-core liabilities, thereby reducing vulnerabilities on the liability side of bank balance 
sheets. One possible drawback is that loan-to-deposit caps do not apply to branches of 
foreign banks. Their other proposal, a levy on foreign-non-core liabilities, has several ad-
vantages in such cases.57 First, the base of the levy varies over the financial cycle, so even 
if the rate remains constant over time, it functions as an automatic stabiliser. Second, the 
levy on non-core liabilities addresses financial vulnerability but leaves intact the financial 
system’s function of channeling core funding from savers to borrowers. Third, targeting 
non-core liabilities tends to address emerging economies’ vulnerabilities to sudden rever-
sals in capital flows as a result of deleveraging by banks. Developing and emerging 
‘small, open economies’ should carefully consider which macroprudential instruments are 
best for the risks that stem from international capital flows. 
One lesson from the crisis is that banks must reveal their exposure to risks that result from 
operations. Correira et al. (2009) stress that prompt, regular and reliable reporting is need-
ed. Transparency helps to discipline banks by encouraging more cautious lending behav-
iour: if banks take very risky positions, depositors and investors will lose confidence. 
Macroprudential policy frameworks should advocate the creation of greater transparency 
and better disclosure rules as a way of enforcing market discipline. 
Despite the interest of policy makers in emerging economies in establishing macropruden-
tial frameworks, concerns exist that some instruments could negatively impact their econ-
omies. Sinha (2012) reports fears that liquidity and much higher capital requirements 
would adversely affect growth, that the additional risk sensitivity of capital requirements 
would slow credit flows to SMEs, that the proposed net stable funding ratio would raise 
the cost of infrastructure financing, and that being forced to adhere to single/group expo-
sure norms would cripple infrastructure financing. He suggests that supportive policies 
might be necessary. For instance, a slowdown in growth resulting from higher capital re-
                                                            
55 See Forbes and Warnock (2012) for a detailed empirical analysis regarding the determinants of differ-
ent capital flow waves. They distinguish between surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment episodes, con-
cluding that global factors (risk, growth, high interest rates) and contagion (driven by financial or trade 
linkages or regional proximity) are the main drivers of capital flow waves, while domestic variables 
play almost no role. 
56 See also Delgado and Meza (2011) for Central American countries. 
57 See also Bruno and Shin (2013b) for an empirical assessment of the impact of Korea’s macroprudential 
instruments, which include a levy on non-core liabilities. 
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quirements could be cushioned by monetary policy, while SME and infrastructure financ-
ing could be facilitated by guarantee schemes and other measures. Macroprudential policy 
should carefully evaluate trade-offs and use instruments that are specifically adapted for 
each country’s circumstances. 
5 Conclusion 
Since the global financial crisis began, it has become obvious that financial market regula-
tion focusing on the liquidity and solvency position of individual financial intermediaries 
is not sufficient to mitigate the overall risks to financial stability. The real economic costs 
of financial instability are much higher than expected. A core element of the international 
policy response to the crisis has been to strengthen the macroprudential orientation of fi-
nancial market regulation. Macroprudential policy and regulation represent an enhanced 
regulatory focus on systemic risks in the financial system and their repercussions on the 
macroeconomy. 
This paper provides a concise overview of the most important aspects of macroprudential 
policy making from an emerging and developing economy perspective. The first part sets 
out the concepts of macroprudential regulation and gives an overview of the state of the 
art with regard to macroprudential policy implementation. Then, it takes the perspective of 
developing and emerging economies, identifies the most important sources of systemic 
risks, discusses the specific challenges for the development of macroprudential policy 
frameworks under given circumstances, and establishes recommendations regarding 
macroprudential policy choices for developing and emerging economies. 
Three findings underscore why macroprudential policy makers should carefully assess if a 
macroprudential policy framework has been properly adapted to the needs and specific 
circumstances of a particular developing economy. 
First, in developing economies many financial systems are dominated by the banking sector 
and have relatively thin financial markets with few asset classes. The fewer asset classes 
there are for diversification, the more dependent the local banking sector and other econom-
ic agents are on the sovereign debt market for liquid securities. With regard to systemic risk, 
a negative side effect of large sovereign debt holdings is the build-up of a broadly shared 
common exposure to public finances and political risks. Macroprudential policy makers 
should consider potential systemic risks that stem from common exposures and seek to es-
tablish a more diversified bond market, and deeper financial markets in general. 
Second, financial systems in developing countries are much more dependent on credit 
intermediation by foreign banks, cross-border lending, foreign-currency funding in 
wholesale markets, and relatively volatile capital flows than those in developed econo-
mies. Systemic risk in the financial sector always has an international component. The 
strong presence of international banking groups in many developing and emerging coun-
tries and the expanding web of intra-regional banking relationships make coordination 
with outside regulators crucial, for example, regarding cross-border consolidated super-
vision. To enhance financial stability, a macroprudential framework must include coor-
dination and cooperation mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral policy making. 
Macroprudential financial market regulation 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 33 
Third, because developing countries’ financial systems play substantive roles in financing 
sustainable economic growth, it is feared that macroprudential financial market regulation 
could lead to lower levels of financial intermediation. Therefore, to enhance the ac-
ceptance and accountability of macroprudential policy, it might be necessary to adapt the 
governance structure. In addition to the primary objective of enhancing financial stability, 
it might be useful to specify a secondary policy objective such as “maintaining a level of 
financial services conducive to the balances growth of the economy”. This would clearly 
indicate the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of macroprudential financial market 
regulation, and macroprudential policy could be held accountable for supporting balanced 
growth. 
To sum up, the development of macroprudential policy frameworks that foster financial 
and macroeconomic stability is a high priority for policy makers in developing countries. 
But that requires choosing institutional models, indicators and instruments to suit the par-
ticular financial and its governance structures. 
How can development cooperation support developing countries’ participation in the 
changing global financial landscape? Recurrent financial crises in many developing and 
emerging economies have led to the introduction of various instruments of a macropru-
dential nature, so that these countries already have had some experience with the imple-
mentation of macroprudential tools. Ongoing reforms of financial market regulation offer 
opportunities for fruitful dialogue between advanced, emerging and developing countries 
regarding the use of macroprudential policy instruments. Development cooperation could 
make an important contribution by initiating and fostering this dialogue. 
Developing countries’ participation in decision-making processes must be enhanced in 
order to support their ownership of the reform process. Discussions about global macro-
prudential policies are currently taking place in three international organisations – the 
IMF, the BIS, and the FSB – each of which has distinct experience and expertise in mac-
roeconomic and macroprudential analysis. A few emerging countries are active at the 
BCBS and the FSB. However, the IMF is the only organisation in which all developing 
countries are represented and entitled to discuss and shape macroprudential policy mak-
ing. Development cooperation could either advocate a strong role for the IMF in analytical 
and advisory work regarding macroprudential policy, or support developing countries’ 
stronger representation in the relevant decision-making bodies. 
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